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WATER AGENCIES' DISTRIBUTION AND INEFFICIENCY UNDER 
DIFFERENT DECISION RULES 
 
Richard Howitt, Professor and Chair, Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of 
California, Davis, One Shields Drive, Davis CA 95616, howitt@primal.ucdavis.edu, 
530-752-1521 
David Zetland, PhD Candidate, Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of California, 
Davis, One Shields Drive, Davis CA 95616, david@primal.ucdavis.edu, 530-752-2092 
 
 
 
Water management organizations often distribute water among members according to a political 
decision function (e.g., voting, historical delivery, etc.) -- not economic functions of willingness 
to pay or shadow values. As a result, scarce water supplies are lost to some members and found 
by others, leading to, respectively, over-conservation or over-use of water by the members. 
 
We find analytical equilibria with a two-player, game-theoretic model of optimal water 
distribution under economic (base case) and different political allocation rules (historic 
allocation, land-values, population, agricultural intensity) to measure the theoretical distortion of 
each allocation compared to the base case. We then simulate model with n-players to examine 
the effects of heterogeneous types and interactive influences with different parameter values. We 
compare these results to the actual allocation of water between the 26 members of the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California to estimate the distribution of costs and 
benefits to MWD members under MWD's political allocation mechanism. 
 
 
 
Contact: David Zetland, Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, 
david@primal.ucdavis.edu, 421 Russell Park, Apt 6, Davis, CA 95616, 530-848-9208,  
530-752-5614 
How Inefficient Are Rules for Distributing and Pricing Water 
at the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California?  
Can We Improve on Them?  
(Extended Abstract) 
 
David Zetland 
 
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) is a wholesale cooperative 
mainly concerned with distributing both treated and untreated water from the State Water Project 
(SWP) and Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) to its 26 member agencies, who then redistribute 
the water to customers or other water agencies. 
 
In this paper, I demonstrate how the rules governing the quantity delivered and the price charged 
in MWD-member transactions decrease overall efficiency. I develop inductive models of 
quantity and price separately to reflect the fact that quantity and price are not jointly determined: 
Quantity can be a function of administrative allocation, not price; price is often a function of 
projected, not actual, quantity demanded. 
 
For quantity, I use an analytical model to show how water allocation via preferential rights leads 
risk-averse managers to underinvest in productive infrastructure. I also argue that the mere 
presence of preferential rights—even if they are not exercised—can create the same effect. 
 
For price, on the other hand, I show how MWD's current price schedule distorts signals to 
conserve scarce water. The resulting increase in base demand and conveyance capacity leads to 
higher volatility of quantity demanded. Misallocated resources and mismatched supply and 
demand create inefficiency and pressure for expensive solutions that do not address the root 
causes of the problem. 
 
I conclude with a qualitative discussion of how markets might replace decision rules to increase 
efficiency in quantity and price, while maintaining MWD's present engineering and 
organizational structure. Although this paper is explicitly concerned with efficiency (ensuring 
that scarce water supplies end up with those who value them most), equity considerations are 
never far from the surface. The current rules for deciding quantity and prices are fair to some and 
not to others; MWD's institutional structure could be the foundation of a framework combining 
efficiency while transparently addressing equity. I suggest evolutionary steps to take MWD in 
the right direction. 
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